SOCIAL POLICY INITIATIVE

Policy Brief

Nomahlubi Jakuja

April 2024

The Economics of Implementing Universal Basic Income in South Africa

Social Policy Initiative

From **Duma Gqubule's** paper on "The Economics of Implementing Universal Basic Income in South Africa" **Noma Jakuja** developed a policy brief.

ACTSA Action for Southern Africa
supported by ACTSA-Bob Hughes small grant award

Key Messages

A Universal Basic Income is not a social welfare but an economic stimulus.

The country's high unemployment rates, especially among its young black women, places it on an unsustainable trajectory.

The Nation of Young Women (black) bears the brunt of the low economic growth rate, and high inequality and unemployment rates.

The Policy Brief calls for a UBI to the value of R656.9 billion to be implemented over three years as one of seven pillars of fundamental reforms.

The Social Policy Initiative's UBI has up to 96% self-financing component.

The Universal Basic Income needs to be at a macro scale both in size and composition.

Introduction

Thirty years into South Africa's democracy the country has a 41.1% (Q4 2023) rate of unemployment with young black women disproportionally affected by unemployment. South Africa is the most unequal country in the world with a GINI coefficient of 0.61 (World Bank, 2024).
One of the pillars used by the World Economic Forum in assessing global risk and growth is inclusiveness. Under this pillar, the provision of basic services and access to adequate social protection remain major drivers of inclusion (WEF, 2024). Upper middle-income economies have an average score of 54.8, exhibiting a somewhat stronger inclusive growth performance. South Africa has an inclusive score of 52.9. Location, race, gender, age, and parental status play a crucial role in South Africa's overall inequality measures.

There is a need for multiple policies to address the multiple dimensions of the crisis. This brief proposes the implementation of a Universal Basic Income as part of a fiscal policy strategy, one policy of many that will need to accompany the implementation of a UBI to reap the positive impacts of this economic stimulus.

Significant contributions to literature on the size of an effective stimulus package have been achieved in the last decade. A sizeable fiscal policy stimulus can not only kick-start economic activity but can prevent Gross Domestic Product (GPD) from declining further than current levels. This policy brief makes a significant contribution to the growing literature on UBI for South Africa by first presenting data on South Africa's past stimulus packages and how much of that went to social security and compares this with other countries in the G20 and BRICS and secondly, the brief looks at what percentage of GDP the economic stimulus accounted for with an effort to make a case that compared to other countries the size of South Africa's fiscal stimulus has not been BIG enough.

Implementing an expansionary fiscal policy is a widely accepted and pursued response to growing the economy and as a response to crisis. An expansionary monetary policy is usually the first line of defence. The effectiveness of monetary policy beyond the first line of defence remains a debatable topic in economic policy (Prasad and Sorkin, 2009). The composition, size, and frontloading (the speed with which the policy is implemented) of an economic fiscal policy are important criteria for an effective policy and these differ from country to country. Some countries include certain measures in their fiscal stimulus to protect the most vulnerable members of society while others use social protection as a direct tool to inject money into the economy. This policy brief makes the case for why South Africa should implement a UBI as an economic stimulus package. The brief also presents data on the extent, composition (spending), and size of such a stimulus package required to grow the South African economy. Considerations given for the size of the stimulus package include South Africa's historical legacy of an economy that has been struggling to grow beyond 5% in the last decade, high unemployment rates especially among the country's young population, high poverty and inequality levels, deterioration of a decent standard of living of South Africans and anticipating future shocks to the economy such as the Just Climate Transition.

A Universal Basic Income is needed as an economic policy in South Africa

The 2024 Social Policy Initiative (SPI) Strategic Position Paper provides an updated analysis of the economics of implementing Universal Basic Income (UBI) in South Africa (link). There are two fundamental principles that underpin the economics of UBI. Firstly, UBI is primarily about economic stimulus and recovery, not redistribution or reducing inequality, though it will help to achieve these objectives. To paraphrase a former United States president: "UBI is about the economy". It is an economic stimulus, not a grant! The end goal is to achieve full employment, defined as an unemployment rate of less than 5%. UBI is the first step on the path towards full employment. If UBI is about recovery, we must let it rip and provide the largest possible stimulus to the economy. It becomes sustainable within the context of a significantly higher GDP growth rate and generates the resources to mostly pay for itself.

South Africa's economy has performed dismally since its miracle transition to democracy three decades ago. From 1994 to 2022 GDP per capita, an imperfect measure of average living standards, increased by 22% (SARB, 2024a). By comparison, over the same period, GDP per capita growth in local currencies, was 783% in China, 337% in Vietnam, 315% in Ethiopia, 285% in India, and 216% in Poland, according to the World Bank (2023a). In South Africa, GDP per capita in 2023 was lower than it was in 2007. It is expected to decline for another three years from 2024 to 2026. By the end of 2026, the country will have had 19 years of declining average living standards. We cannot continue like this.

After thirty years South Africa has the highest levels of unemployment, poverty, and inequality in the world with Black African women bearing the brunt of the triple challenges. South Africa has the world's highest unemployment rate. Djibouti is in second position (World Bank, 2023b). During the third quarter of 2023, according to Stats SA (2023a), there were 11.7 million unemployed people, and the unemployment rate was 41.2%. The country also has the world's second-highest youth unemployment rate after Djibouti. There were 2.4 million young people aged 15 to 24 who had no work, and their unemployment rate was 67.6%. There were also 8.7 million young people (15-34) who were not in education, employment, or training (NEET).

Nearly half of the country lives in poverty and one in five people have inadequate access to food. The DSD (2021) found that there were 29.1 million people – 48.9% of the population – who were living in households that had a per capita monthly disposable income that was below Stats SA's upper bound poverty line of R1 300 a month. Stats SA (2021) found that 20.6% of households nationally considered their access to food as inadequate or severely inadequate. South Africa is also the most unequal country in the world. The top 10% earned 67% of incomes and owned 86% of wealth, according to Chancel et al. (2022) in an analysis for the World Inequality Lab.

It has not always been doom and gloom. There was a period from 2003 to 2008 when the government pursued an expansionary fiscal policy under the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (Gear) policy of 1996 and significantly increased spending on its people and infrastructure. The economy grew by 4.5% a year, creating 3.1 million jobs, and the unemployment rate fell to 28.7% from 40.6% (Stats SA, 2020). But since the global financial crisis of 2008, the government stopped spending on its people and infrastructure. The GDP growth rate collapsed, and unemployment soared. There is no single policy that will get the country to achieve full employment. There is a need for multiple policies to address the multiple dimensions of the crisis. The policy tools to confront the crisis must be very large and have an impact throughout the economy.

The drivers of unemployment on the supply-side are the annual number of new entrants into the labour force or the labour force growth rate. Using a population growth rate of 2.4%, slightly lower than the pre-pandemic average, almost 800 000 people will enter the labour market each year until 2035. On the demand side, the GDP growth rate and the employment multiplier determine the employment growth rate. The employment multiplier is an observed historical relationship between GDP and employment (Gqubule, 20203). The economy has an employment multiplier of 0.9 based on an analysis of the past two decades that strips out two periods of fundamental dislocation in the labour market after the global financial crisis of 2008 and the pandemic of 2020 (Gqubule, 20203). This means that there must be an annual GDP growth rate of 4.2% just to create jobs for the new entrants into the labour market until 2035 (Gqubule, 20203). Therefore, GDP growth alone will not be enough to achieve full employment.

There are three levers to confront the unemployment crisis. First, there must be a GDP growth rate that is high enough to create enough jobs for all the new entrants into the labour market and gradually reduce the number of previously unemployed people (Gqubule, 20203). Second, industrial policies must seek to change the structure of production according to the broad division of the following sectors – agriculture, industry and services – and within these sectors (Gqubule, 20203). Such policies can increase the employment multiplier and accelerate the pace of job creation by targeting labour-intensive sectors that can absorb the unemployed and diversify the export basket. Third, public employment programmes (PEPs) can create a residual number of jobs that cannot be created through GDP growth and industrial policies (Gqubule, 20203).

Composition and Size of a Universal Basic Income

The SPI paper calls for the implementation of a UBI for adults and children valued at R862.9 billion over three years – R557.7bn for adults and R305.2 billion for children who received a means-tested CSG (Child Support Grant) of R505 per month during 2023-2024. The CSG, which reaches about two-thirds of all children, must be universal but this paper uses statistics provided by National Treasury in the 2023 MTBPS. Assuming a 70% uptake, the number of UBI adult beneficiaries will be 25 million in 2024-2025, 25.4 million in 2025-2026 and 25.8 million in 2026-2027, using Stats SA's 2022 population projections. CSG beneficiaries will be 13.7 million in 2024-2025, 13.9 million in 2025-2026 and 14.1 million in 2026-2027.

There will be clawback of basic income from 70% of 7.1 million people who are above the income tax threshold. Therefore, there could be about 33 million net UBI beneficiaries during 2026-2027. After escalating the 2023 national poverty lines by 5% a year, adults and children will receive: UBI at an FPL of R798 per month (R9 576 a year) during 2024-2025, an LBPL of R1 166 a month (R13 992 a year) during 2025-2026 and a UBPL of R1 804 a month (R21 648 a year) in 2026-2027. In 2026-2027 an unemployed mother of two children will receive three UBI payments of R5 412 a month (R64 944 a year) for herself and her children. After subtracting the clawback and budgeted CSG spend, the net cost of implementing UBI for adults and children will be R656.9 billion over three years.

The Social Policy Initiative calls for A UBI that will be paid to adults (18 – 59) and children who received a child support grant (CSG) of R505 per month during 2023-2024. The assumption is that there will be a 70% uptake for adults since not all people who are eligible to get basic income will elect to receive it. There will also be a clawback from 70% of 7.1 million people who are above the income tax threshold. A core principle of this proposal is that UBI must be pegged to objective measures of poverty and not random numbers.

After escalating the 2023 national poverty lines by 5% a year, adults and children will receive: UBI of R798 per month (R9 576 a year) during 2024-2025, R1 166 a month (R13 992 a year) during 2025-2026 and R1 804 a month (R21 648 a year) during 2026-2027. By the third year, about 33 million people will be receiving UBI – 18.7 million adults and 14.1 million children. After the subtracting the clawback and budgeted CSG spend, the net cost of implementing UBI will be R656.9 billion over three years.

National Treasury has forecast an average annual GDP growth rate of 1.5% during the three-year medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) period until 2026-2027. The additional spending on UBI will provide a fiscal stimulus of R985.4 billion, assuming a multiplier of 1.5 times, equivalent to 4.1% of National Treasury's projected GDP during the MTEF period. The economy could grow by 5.6% a year. Under the status quo scenario, the economy will create 724 000 jobs during the MTEF period. Under the UBI scenario, the economy will create 2.7 million jobs – about 2 million additional jobs.

National Treasury has forecast that national debt will increase to R6.5 trillion in 2026-2027, equivalent to 77.5% of GDP. After implementing UBI, debt will increase to R7.2 trillion in 2026-2027. But since GDP will be R1 trillion higher at R9.4 trillion in 2026-2027 than in National Treasury's forecasts, the debt ratio will decline to 76.9% of GDP. This means that the debt-to-GDP ratio will be almost the same with or without implementing the UBI. There are three elements of UBI self-financing. By 2026-2027, the government will receive additional VAT receipts of R78.8 billion, a clawback of R108.2 billion and higher tax revenues of R593 billion due to the stimulus effect. After paying additional interest of R46 billion there could be UBI self-financing of R734.4 billion, equivalent to 96% of the cost of implementing it.

When considering size, we assess not only the size of the economic stimulus package but also the size of the proportion allocated to social security. The size allocated to social security is important because it directly helps people from losing their incomes and offers those currently unemployed with no income's direct sources of income (Zhang et al., 2010). A UBI allocates 100 percent of the economic stimulus to the most vulnerable members of our economy. This is important in redressing the current social ills and setting our country on the right economic trajectory where no South African is economically excluded.

Evidence Shows that compared to global peers South Africa is not spending a lot on its Social Security Measures using COVID-19 as an example.

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2008 global financial crisis was the reported event where countries across the globe pursued fiscal stimulus packages to recover from the crises. In 2008 the government of the United States of America had the largest fiscal stimulus valued at USD 787 billion, followed by China with USD 585 billion and Japan in third place with USD 298 billion (Zhang et al., 2010). India's Stimulus package was USD 38.9 billion, and Russia's stimulus package valued at USD 53.6 billion and South Africa only injecting USD9.9 billion (See figure 1). These packages exclude financial measures such as government guarantees and public loans, financial bailouts, measures taken by central banks, and the acquisition of securities and loans issued by the private sector (Zhang et al., 2010). The packages include only discretionary measures announced. Fiscal policy including both automatic stabilizers and crisis-related spending play in important role both in cushioning against exogenous shocks and as overall economic growth policies. The composition, size and frontloading of the stimulus determine the effectiveness of the fiscal stimulus.

Measures that constitute social security vary from country to country. In this policy brief social security components measured in each stimulus package is defined as any policy intervention intended to reduce poverty and vulnerability, especially vulnerability induced by economic shocks (ILO, 2022).

Compared to its peers South Africa's fiscal stimulus package in 2008 was significantly lower with the proportion allocated to social security even lower. The stimulus as a percentage of GDP measured 4, 03%. In the same year South Africa's annual real GDP growth rate was -1,5% (World Bank, 2009). The inflation rate for the country was 7.1% (Statssa, 2009). Ceteris Paribus the bigger the size of the fiscal stimulus the bigger the rate of GDP growth should be accounting for the spending multiplier. From Figure 1 below we can see countries that had a higher fiscal stimulus and a larger portion of it allocated to social security also reported higher levels of GDP in the same year. Figure 2, accounting for time for the package to kick in, also shows higher levels of GDP growth rates in the same countries over time.

Figure 1: Value of Countries Fiscal Stimulus Packages 2008



Source: (Zhang et al., 2010) IMF 2009

We again saw the important role a fiscal stimulus can play in the economy during the COVID 19 pandemic. Studies have shown the positive correlation between GDP growth and a fiscal stimulus (Sheiner et al., 2021). A fiscal stimulus positively affects economic growth by stimulating economic activity. A fiscal stimulus is also accompanied by a spending multiplier which increases the total impact of the stimulus on the economy. For the full impact of the stimulus to be realised the time it takes for the stimuli to be injected into the economy is important. This is called frontloading (Sheiner et al., 2021). The fiscal package chosen needs to be one the allows for the injection to be felt in the economy in the shortest time before automatic economic stabilizers kick in. Social security measures (especially ones encouraging spending) are often the method chosen by policymakers as they can be implemented quickly and the effects felt in the economy in the shortest time frames. However, supporting policies need to also be put in place to lock in the economic growth gains from the stimuli.

The COVID-19 pandemic once again highlighted the dual role of social security as both an economic and social stabiliser (ILO, 2022). Again, here we saw that compared to its peers South Africa is not spending enough to get the economy growing at the levels outlined in our National Development plan. The total size of fiscal stimulus announced for 2020 in Figure 2 is collected from the UN COVID-19 Tracker and national government records and may include government guarantees and public loans, financial bailouts, measures taken by central banks, and the acquisition of securities and loans issued by the private sector. The inclusion of these measures only makes the fiscal stimulus bigger in nominal terms and does not influence the correlation between a fiscal stimulus and GDP growth rate.

Figure 2: COVID 19 Fiscal Stimulus Packages in 2020



Source: UNESCWA Tracker 2020 and Statistic South Africa

Financing a Universal Basic Income

So where will the money come from? This is a question frequently asked. Firstly, we have demonstrated in this policy brief (see Figure 1 and 2) that the narrative that South Africa is spending a lot already is not only a relative statement but not true compared to its peers. We also showed that large fiscal spending in response to shocks contributes to GDP growth. While the brief did not include in its model loans from central banks, this is an area that remains unexplored, rather not fully maximized in South Africa's financing for fiscal spending.

Secondly, South Africa has a large public sector balance sheet that has assets of almost R4 trillion. This includes assets worth R2.6-trillion at the Public Investment Corporation – the asset manager of the Unemployment Insurance Fund and the Government Employees Pension Fund and – and foreign exchange reserves of R1.2-trillion. The assets remain untapped as financing options for a UBI and are way above what is required to pay pensions and unemployment benefits and cover imports. For full research on this please see working paper (link). This policy brief proposes a once-off restructuring of these assets in order to release half of these assets into the economy.

A developmental central bank can finance government spending, take over the bond market for an extended period, capitalise DFIs and use regulatory levers to influence the allocation of private capital (Gqubule, 2023). The driver of the rising debt ratio is that the cost of capital is greater than the GDP growth rate (Gqubule, 2023). The Treasury and the Reserve Bank can coordinate monetary and fiscal policies to repress the cost of government debt and increase the GDP growth rate.

SA Inc also has a large public sector balance sheet that has assets of almost R4-trillion (Gqubule, 2023). This includes assets worth R2.6-trillion at the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) – the asset manager of the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) and the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) - and foreign exchange reserves of R1.2-trillion. The government also has cash of about R150 billion (Gqubule, 2023). The UIF still has a surplus of R110 billion, according to National Treasury (2023), after the government created almost R60 billion "out of thin air" and paid 13.8 million people who were unemployed during the Covid-19 lockdowns (Gqubule, 2023). There was no need for the surplus before the pandemic and there is still no need for it now. The GEPF accumulated surpluses of R587.1 billion during the 11 years to 2022-2023 (Gqubule, 2023).

In 2021 the GEPF had funding of 110% — almost R400 billion above the 90% target its trustees have set (Gqubule, 2023). There is no need for these surpluses (Gqubule, 2023). A company can go bust and must pay all its pensions on the same day (Gqubule, 2023). But there is no scenario in which the government will ever have to pay 1.3 million pensions on the same day (Gqubule, 2023). The GEPF's surpluses are the equivalent of taking an insurance policy for an event that can never happen as is explained in more detail in appendix two (Gqubule, 2023). At the end of November 2023, the Reserve Bank had foreign exchange reserves of R1.2-trillion — R640 billion above the international benchmark that there must be reserves to cover three months of imports (Gqubule, 2023).

Finally, there is no universe in which South Africa's debt ratio of about 75% is high by international standards, even when it is benchmarked against emerging market peers (Gqubule, 2023). The IMF (2023a) projected a world average debt ratio of 93.3% for 2023 (Gqubule, 2023). According to the IMF (2023b) advanced countries had an average debt ratio of 112.1% with Japan (255%), Greece (168%) and Italy (143.7%) having the highest debt ratios (Gqubule, 2023). The average for emerging market and middle-income countries was 68.3% with countries such as Egypt (92.7%), Angola (84%), China (83%) and India (81.9%) having much higher debt ratios (Gqubule, 2023). The conclusion is that SA Inc. can finance a stimulus for the economy, which includes higher spending on UBI, a job guarantee, infrastructure, industrial policies, universal public services, subsidised public electricity, transport and mass housing and regional integration. Below is a menu of funding options (Gqubule, 2023).

1. Monetary Finance

Monetary finance refers to the central bank's creation of "public money" to support government spending (Gqubule, 2023). The central bank simply transfers the money to the government's account. This means that the Reserve Bank can fund government spending, including a fiscal stimulus and UBI (Gqubule, 2023). There could be institutional or political mechanisms to ensure that there is no abuse of the power to create public money - a parliamentary approval process for Reserve Bank transfers to the fiscus, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or DFIs that is like the one that was used in the United Kingdom (Gqubule, 2023). Such transfers should also be informed by detailed analysis of the economy's productive capacity (Gqubule, 2023).

2. Central Bank Lending

The Reserve Bank can bypass the bond market and directly lend to the government, SOEs or DFIs on favourable terms – at the repo rate or with payment holidays - until the economy recovers (Gqubule, 2023).

3. Quantitative Easing

The Reserve Bank can significantly increase its purchases of government bonds on the secondary market, where existing debt instruments are traded (Gqubule, 2023). It should take over the market for an extended period and determine the cost of government borrowing using a strategy that is called yield targeting (Gqubule, 2023).

4. PIC lending

The PIC can by-pass the bond market and directly lend to the government, SOEs or DFIs on favourable terms – at lower interest rates or with payment holidays until the economy recovers (Gqubule, 2023). It can also purchase government bonds on the secondary market (Gqubule, 2023).

5. Increased borrowing

South Africa can increase its borrowing on the bond market to finance a stimulus for the economy (Gqubule, 2023). This must be accompanied by monetary-fiscal policy coordination with the Reserve Bank pursuing a yield targeting strategy to reduce the cost of government borrowing (Gqubule, 2023).

6. Restructuring the SA Inc. Balance Sheet

The assets in the PIC are way more than what is required to pay public sector pensions and unemployment benefits (Gqubule, 2023). The Reserve Bank also has excess foreign exchange reserves, as is explained in more detail in Full Paper SA Inc. can have a one-off restructuring of its balance sheet with a 50% reduction of PIC assets and foreign exchange reserves that can release R1.9 trillion into the economy. The restructuring can involve:

- The PIC writing off state debt worth R700 billion, which would reduce the debt ratio by 10 percentage points to 64.7% of GDP (Gqubule, 2023).
- The PIC writing off Eskom, Transnet and SANRAL debt worth R127.1 billion (Gqubule, 2023).
- The PIC transferring R500 billion to the fiscus (Gqubule, 2023).
- The Reserve Bank reducing its foreign exchange reserves by R600 billion. A portion can be used to settle Eskom and Transnet's foreign denominated debt and the rest can be sold on the foreign exchange market for rands and transferred to the fiscus (Gqubule, 2023).

7. Higher Taxes

To maximize the efficacy of the stimulus effect and the self-financing element of UBI, there should be no new taxes for 99% of South Africans during the economic recovery phase (Gqubule, 2023). But South Africa can increase taxes on idle wealth and high earners that will not impede a fragile recovery or reduce the efficacy of the proposed UBI stimulus. Chaterjee et al. (2020) estimate that a wealth tax could raise more than R140 billion (Gqubule, 2023). Civil society organisations have proposed other taxes on resource rents, financial transactions, dividends, and luxury goods (Gqubule, 2023). They have called for measures to curb illicit financial flows and profit shifting and cancelling the wasteful employment tax incentive The government could also raise more funds from reducing corruption and wasteful spending (IEJ, 2021).

Conclusion

The policy brief has demonstrated that South Africa's past fiscal expenditure has been low relative to other countries. The paper has also shown that relative to its high unemployment rates and high inequality rates South Africa should be in fact spending more. As South Africa looks forward and makes economic and social plans for the sixth administration to build the country, social security presents a previously untapped opportunity to grow the economy while addressing the social ills of the country. A Universal Basic Income (UBI) must be part of such a plan for the South African economy. A UBI is primarily about economic stimulus and recovery, not redistribution or reducing inequality, though it will help to achieve these objectives. It becomes sustainable within the context of a significantly higher GDP growth rate and generates the resources to mostly pay for itself.

References

Balakrishnan, R, Heintz, J and Elson, D (2016) Rethinking Economic Policy for Social Justice: The Radical Potential of Human Rights, Routledge

Cardoso, D, Carvalho, L, Tadeu Lima, G, Nassif-Pires, L, Rugitsky, F and Sanches, M (2023) The Multiplier Effects of Government Expenditures on Social Protection: A Multi-Country Analysis. Department of Economics – FEA/USP Working Paper Series No. 2023-11. Available at: https://ideas.repec.org/f/c/pba881.html

Chancel, L, Piketty, T, Saez, E, Zucman, G et al. (2022) World Inequality Report 2022, World Inequality Lab. Available at: https://wir2022.wid.world/

Chatterjee, A, L Czajka, and A Gethin (2020), "Estimating the distribution of household wealth in South Africa", WID.world Working Paper 2020/06. Available at https://wid.world/fr/news-article/how-unequal-is-the-wealth-distribution-in-south-africa-2/

Department of Social Development (DSD) (2020) Expert Panel Report on Basic Income Support. Available at: https://www.dsd.gov.za/index.php/documents?task=download.send&id=356&catid=58&m=0

Epstein, G (2005) Central Banks as Agents of Economic Development. Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) University of Massachusetts Amherst. Working Paper Series Number 104. Available at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/peri_workingpapers/103/

Epstein, G (2019) The Institutional, Empirical and Policy Limits of 'Modern Money Theory' Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) University of Massachusetts Amherst. Working Paper Series Number 481. Available at: https://peri.umass.edu/publication/item/1159-the-institutional-empirical-and-policy-limits-of-modern-money-theory

Eskom (2022) Eskom Group Annual Results for the year ended 31 March 2022, Presentation. Available at: https://www.eskom.co.za/investors/integrated-results/

Gabor, D (2021) Revolution without Revolutionaries: Interrogating the Return of Monetary Financing. Finanzwende/Heinrich-Böll-Foundation. Available at: https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/ja9bk

GEPF (2021) Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) Statutory Actuarial Valuation as at 31 March 2021. Prepared by Alexander Forbes Financial Services and African Origins Actuarial Solutions, November 2021. Available at: https://www.gepf.co.za/evaluation-report/

Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) (2023) GEPF Annual Report 2022/23. Available at: https://www.gepf.co.za/annual-reports/

Gqubule, D (2022) A Basic Income Grant For a Better South Africa: The Evolution of Social Assistance in South Africa Since 1994. Social Policy Initiative Working Paper. Available at: https://www.spi.net.za/a-basic-income-grant-for-a-better-south-africa-the-evolution-of-social-assistance-in-south-africa-after-1994/

Institute for Economic Justice (IEJ) (2021) Financing Options for Universal Basic Income Guarantee in South Africa. Social Security Policy Brief 2. Available at: https://www.iej.org.za/financing-options-for-a-universal-basic-income-guarantee-in-south-africa/

International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2023a) Fiscal Monitor. On the Path to Policy Normalization. Washington DC: IMF, April. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2023/04/03/fiscal-monitor-april-2023

International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2023b) Fiscal Monitor: Climate Crossroads: Fiscal Policies in a

Warming World. Washington DC: IMF, October. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2023/10/10/fiscal-monitor-october-2023

Kelton, S (2020) The Deficit Myth: Modern Monetary Theory and How to Build a Better Economy, John Murray

Makgetla, N (2016) Using the UIF Surplus as Part of a Stimulus Package. Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) Policy Brief: 1/2016. Avaiable at: https://www.tips.org.za/policy-briefs/item/3101-using-the-uif-surplus-as-part-of-a-stimulus-package

Mbeng Mezui, C and Duru, U (2013) Holding Excess Foreign Exchange Reserves Versus Infrastructure Finance: What Should Africa Do? African Development Bank Group Working Paper Series, No 178 July 2013

Available at https://ideas.repec.org/p/adb/adbwps/478.html

National Treasury (2023a) Budget Review 2023. Pretoria: National Treasury. Available at: https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/National%20Budget/2023/

National Treasury (2023b) Medium Term Budget Policy Statement. Pretoria. National Treasury. Available at: https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/mtbps/2023/default.aspx

Ponds et al (2011) "Funding in Public Sector Pensions Plans: International Evidence," OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private Pensions, No 8, OECD Publishing

Available at: http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/47827915.pdf

Public Investment Corporation (PIC) (2023a) Public Investment Corporation Integrated Annual Report Twenty 23. Available at: https://www.pic.gov.za/Pages/publications.aspx#shortpoint-tab-1=shortpoint-gt-1-i-3

Public Investment Corporation (PIC) (2023b) Reporting on Listed and Unlisted Investments for the Year ended 31 March 2023 in terms of Section 10 (5) of the PIC Act. Available at: https://www.pic.gov.za/Pages/publications.aspx#shortpoint-tab-1=shortpoint-gt-1-i-3

Ryan-Collins, J and Van Levren, F (2018) bringing the Helicopter to the Ground: A Historical Review of Fiscal-Monetary Coordination to Support Growth in the 20th Century. UCL Institute for Public Purpose Working Paper Series (IIPP WP 2018-08). Available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/publications/2018/aug/bringing-helicopter-ground

SANRAL (2023) South African National Roads Agency (SANRAL) Integrated Report 2022/2023. Volume 2. Available at: https://www.nra.co.za/integrated-report?region_id=national

SARB (2023) South African Reserve Bank (SARB) Full Quarterly Bulletin – No 310 – December 2023. Available at: https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/quarterly-bulletins/quarterly-bulletin-publications/2023/FullQuarterlyBulletinNo309December2023

SARB (2024a) South African Reserve Bank (SARB) Online Statistical Query. Available at:

https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/what-we-do/statistics/releases/online-statistical-query

SARB (2024b) South African Reserve Bank (SARB) Information notice on the official gold and foreign exchange reserves of the South African Reserve Bank as at 31 December 2023. Available at: https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/Financial-Markets/Notices/Information-Notice/2023/information-notice-gold-and-foreign-exchange-reserves-31-december-2023

Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) (2020) Excel spreadsheet 'Labour Force Series September 2000 – September 2007' in new Quarterly Labour Force Series format generated by Statistics South Africa, email correspondence from Malerato Mosiane, 8 January 2020

Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) (2021) General Household Survey 2020. Available at:

http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/GHS%202020%20Presentation%202-Dec-21.pdf

Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) (2023a) P0211 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Quarter 3: 2023, Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) Publication. Available at: at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P0211

Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) (2023b) P30043 Manufacturing: Utilisation of Production Capacity by Large Enterprises (Preliminary). August 2023. Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P3043&SCH=73431

Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) (2023c) P0310.1 National Poverty Lines 2023. Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P0310.1&SCH=73623

Transnet (2023) Transnet 2023 Annual Financial Statements. Available at: https://www.transnet.net/InvestorRelations/Pages/Annual-Results-2023.aspx

UIF (2021) Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) Annual Report 2020/21. Available at: https://pmg.org.za/files/UIF_2020-2021_Annual_Report.pdf

World Bank (2023a) Online database. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KN?locations=CN&most_recent_value_desc=true

World Bank (2023b) World Bank Open Data available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?most_recent_value_desc=false

Pictures: https://www.freepik.com/ and https://elements.envato.com/